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Specific performance of contracts 
in comparative law: 
some preliminary observations 
Louis J. ROMERO * 
On dit souvent que l'exécution en nature (specific performance) est la 
sanction normale (primary remedyj de l'inexécution des obligations contrac-
tuelles (breach of contract,) dans le système de droit civil, alors que dans le sys-
tème de common law cette sanction prend la forme de dommages-intérêts. Cet 
article s'interroge sur Iexactitude de cette assertion. 
L'auteur constate, d'abord, que même là où l'on fait du droit civil en 
anglais, comme au Québec et en Louisiane, l'expression specific performance 
n'a pas le même sens et la même portée qu'en common law. Il souligne, de plus, 
que l'expression primary remedy peut se définir de plusieurs façons, susceptibles 
d'engendrer l'équivoque. Il démontre, enfin, que l'expression breach of contract 
couvre tellement de situations de fait différentes qu'il est impossible de dire 
quelle sanction l'un et l'autre systèmes juridiques préfèrent vraiment. Les 
expressions specific performance et primary remedy ne peuvent en fait se 
comprendre sans prendre en considération l'évolution historique de la notion 
d'exécution en nature dans chaque système de droit. 
La seconde moitié de l'article procède à cette étude historique ; elle conclut 
qu'au-delà de différences deforme les deux systèmes, face à la mise en œuvre de 
politiques semblables, pratiquent des moyens de sanction à toute fin pratique 
équivalents. 
Pages 
Introduction 786 
1. Some Terminological Clarifications 787 
1.1. The meanings of the expression "specific performance" 787 
1.2. The meanings of the expression "primary remedy" 792 
1.3. The meanings of the expression "breach of contract" 795 
* Professor of Law, University of Saskatchewan. This article deals mainly with the 
clarification of terminological problems. A second article will analyse the relationship 
between the rules of specific performance and those dealing with mitigation, quantification 
of damages and the date of their assessment. The author is tankful to Monica Schubert, 
M.A. LL.B. for her editorial suggestions on our early draft of this article. 
Les Cahiers de Droit, vol. 27, n° 4, décembre 1986, p. 785-811 
(1986) 27 Les Cahiers de Droit 785 
786 Les Cahiers de Droit (1986) 27 C. deD. 785 
Pages 
1. Historical Explanation of the Different Approaches 797 
2.1. Specific Performance 797 
2.2. Exécution en nature 803 
Conclusion 808 
Introduction 
Books and articles on the law of contracts often contrast the relative 
importance of specific performance and damages in common law and civil 
law legal systems. The following two statements are typical: 
In civilian theory, specific performance is the primary remedy for the non-
performance of an obligation. [...] It is different at common law, where the 
primary remedy is damages.' 
In some systems of law specific enforcement is the primary remedy for breach 
of contract. In English law, however, and in systems derived from it, these 
remedies have long been regarded as secondary.2 
LITVINOFF, S., Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, vol. 7, St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1969, 
para. 170, p. 317. See also para. 170 at page 319 where the author states: "Specific 
performance is regarded as ordinary relief at civil law ; at common law, it is exceptional and 
extraordinary." See also LAWSON, F.H., Remedies of English Law, 2nd ed., London, 
Butterworths, 1980, p. 173. The statements of Quebec authors on this issue are more 
carefully qualified than those quoted in the text; see TANCELIN, M., Des Obligations — 
Contrat et Responsabilité, Montréal, Wilson & Lafleur, édition revue et corrigée, 1986, at 
pages 376-377, para. 708; BAUDOUIN, J.L., Les Obligations, Cowansville, Éditions Yvon 
Biais, 1983, p. 222, para. 355; p. 390, para. 700; p. 398, para. 711 ; LAROUCHE, A., Les 
Obligations, tome 1, Théorie générale des contrats, quasi-contrats, Ottawa, Univ. Ottawa, 
1982, p. 312, para. 251 ; PINFAU, J., Théorie des obligations, Montréal, Éditions Thémis, 
1979, p. 245. See generally, BAUDOUIN, J.L., "L'exécution spécifique des contrats en droit 
québécois»,(1958) 5 McGilIL.J. 108. 
WADDAMS, S.M., The Law of Contracts, 2nJ ed., Toronto, Canada Law Book Inc., 1984, at 
p. 508. It should be noted that the quoted text uses the expression "specific enforcement" 
rather than "specific performance". It will be shown below that the former expression 
reflects more accurately the meaning oi~execution en nature than the latter. A footnote in the 
quoted text refers to Stewart v. Kennedy (1890), 15 App. Cas. 75 (H.L.), an appeal to the 
House of Lords of a Scottish case, in which Lord Watson made the following statement at 
page 102: "I do not think that upon this matter any assistance can be derived from English 
decisions, because the laws of the two countries regard the right to specific performance 
from different standpoints. In England the only legal right arising from a breach of contract 
is a claim of damages; specific performance is not matter of legal right, but a purely 
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It is a major thesis of this article that statements such as those quoted 
above, although not completely inaccurate, oversimplify a complex reality. 
The first part of this article analyses the different scopes and meanings of the 
expression "specific performance" in the law of Québec and of the Canadian 
common law provinces. It will show that, as the "specific performance" of 
Quebec has a wider meaning than that of the Canadian common law 
provinces, any unqualified general statements about its relative importance 
in both systems are misleading. The first part of this article will also analyse 
the different meanings of the expressions "primary remedy" and "breach of 
contract", contained in statements such as those quoted above, which may 
also lead to confusion when a writer uses them in one sense and a reader 
interprets them in another. Statements about the relative importance of 
remedies for breach of contract in civil law and common law systems can be 
understood in the context of the historical evolution of such remedies. The 
second part of this article analyses such evolution, which explains the 
meanings of such statements, but questions whether they reflect present 
day reality. 
1. Some terminological clarifications 
1.1. The meanings of the expression "specific performance" 
It has often been noted that a source of confusion in comparative law is 
the different meanings given to the same or similar-sounding words and 
expressions used in different legal systems3. These remarks are particularly 
equitable remedy, which the Court can withhold when there are sufficient reasons of 
conscience or expediency against it. But in Scotland the breach of a contract for the sale of a 
specific subject such as landed estate, gives the party aggrieved the right to sue for 
implement, and, although he may elect to do so, he cannot be compelled to resort to the 
alternative of an action of damages unless implement is shewn to be impossible." In 
Scottish law, "specific implement", also called "a decree ad factum praestandum", is a 
judicial decree issued to enforce a contractual positive provision. A negative provision is 
enforced by a "decree of interdict". See WALKER, D.M., Principles of Scottish Private Law, 
3 rd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, p. 157 ; see also JOHNSTON, A.M. and HOPE, J.A.D. 
(ed.), Gloag and Henderson's Introduction to the Law of Scotland, 7lh ed., Edinburgh, 
W. Green & Sons, 1968, p. 123. 
3. For example, René David has stated : "Ne correspondant à aucune notion connue de nous, 
les termes du droit anglais sont intraduisibles dans nos langues, comme sont les termes de la 
faune ou de la flore d'un autre climat. On en dénature le sens, le plus souvent quand on 
veut, coûte que coûte les traduire, et la difficulté n'est pas moindre lorsque la chose paraît 
aller de soi : le contract du droit anglais n'est pas plus l'équivalent du contrat du droit 
français que Vequity anglaise n'est l'équité française; administrative law ne veut pas dire 
droit administratif, civil law ne veut pas dire droit civil, et common law ne veut pas dire droit 
commun." : Les Grands Systèmes de Droit Contemporains, 8e éd. par JAFFRET-SPINOSI, C , 
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applicable to the expression "specific performance", which has been applied 
to both the specific performance of common law systems and what is called 
exécution en nature in Québec, French and Louisiana law4. 
In common law jurisdictions the expression "specific performance" has 
a well understood meaning. A good description was given by Maitland in his 
lectures on Equity : 
In granting a decree for specific performance — or a judgment for specific 
performance — the Court in effect says to the defendant, You must perform 
specifically the contract into which you entered — that is to say you must do 
the very thing that you promised to do on pain of going to prison.5 
In common law systems specific performance is a judicial remedy 
consisting of an order which commands the defendant to perform his 
contractual promise. Disobedience of this order may bring about contempt 
proceedings. 
By way of contrast, the expression exécution en nature refers to the 
plaintiff receiving in kind performance of the contractual promise ; this 
performance may be rendered by the defendant, but also by a sheriff, by a 
third party, or even by the plaintiff himself at the defendant's expense. As a 
French author has stated, exécution en nature refers to what the plaintiff 
receives, not to what the defendant furnishes6. 
Consequently, a first and major difference between exécution en nature 
of civil law systems and specific performance of common law systems is that 
when a civil law court awards exécution en nature it is merely stating that the 
Dalloz, Paris, 1982, p. 342, para. 290. See also DAVID, R. and BRIERLEV, J.E.C., Major 
Legal Systems in the World, London, Stevens, 1978, p. 308, para. 291. For another 
statement to the same effect, see BRIDGE, M.G., "Contractual Damages for Intangible 
Loss: A Comparative Analysis", ( 1984) 62 Can. B. Rev. 323, p. 325. 
4. The English expression "specific performance" is used in article 1065 of the Québec Civil 
Code to refer to exécution en nature. The English version of article 1065 states in part : "The 
creditor may, in cases which admit of it, demand also a specific performance of the 
obligation..." Both the English and the French version of the Québec Civil Code have 
binding force : see J. BRII RI.IY, "Quebec's Civil Law Codification Viewed and Reviewed", 
(1968), 14 McGill L.J. 521 and WALTON, F.P., Le domaine cl l'interprétation du code civil du 
Bas Canada, Toronto, Butterworths, 1980 (translated and with an Introduction by 
Tancelin M.). 
5. MAITLAND, F.W., Equity — A Course of Lectures, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press., 
1936, p. 301. 
6. MEYNIAL, E., "De la sanction civile des obligations de faire ou de ne pas faire", (1884) 56 
Revue pratique de droit français, 385, p. 434-436. The Dictionnaire de droit privé, Montréal, 
Centre de recherche en droit privé et comparé du Québec, 1985, p. 88 defines exécution en 
nature as "Exécution par laquelle le créancier reçoit la prestation même qui lui était due". 
See also LlTVlNOFF, supra, footnote 1, p. 304. 
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plaintiff is entitled to a form of specific relief7 rather than to damages. The 
different forms that exécution en nature may take will vary depending on who 
will render the performance ; it may include, but is not limited to, perform-
ance by the defendant8. On the other hand, when a common law court 
grants a decree of specific performance it orders the defendant to perform 
the contract and at the time of granting the remedy the court contemplates 
only performance of the obligation by the defendant9. 
A second distinction between exécution en nature and specific perform-
ance is that exécution en nature refers to the enforcement of both positive and 
7. The distinction between specific and substitutional forms of relief is explained by 
FARNSWORTH, E.A. in the following terms : "Relief is said to be specific when it is intended 
to give the injured party the very performance that was promised, as when the court orders 
a defaulting seller of goods to deliver them to the buyer. Relief is said to be 'substitutional' 
when it is intended to give the promisee something in substitution for the promised 
performance, as when the court awards a buyer of goods money damages instead of the 
goods." FARNSWORTH, E.A., Contracts, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1982, p. 815 ; see also 
id., p. 819-823 ; FARNSWORTH, E.A., "Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract", (1970), 70 
Col. L. Rev. 1145, p. 1149-1160; see also LAWSON, supra, footnote 1, p. 14. Some authors 
use the expression "specific enforcement" as equivalent to "specific relief: see generally 
WADDAMS, supra, footnote 2. 
8. Unfortunately civil law authors themselves do not use the same terminology to refer to the 
different remmedies available for breach of contract. Different meanings are given to the 
expressions exécution forcée, exécution en nature and exécution par équivalent. First, 
exécution forcée may have a wide meaning, as referring to any kind of non-voluntary or 
enforced performance, (including damages and performance by a third party) (see 
TANCELIN, supra, footnote 1, p. 337, para. 632); exécution forcée has also a narrow 
meaning, as referring only to an order addressed to the defendant commanding him to 
perform his contractual obligations (see BAUDOUIN, supra, footnote 1, p. 30, 31, 32, 393, 
paras. 20, 21, 23, 703). Secondly, exécution en nature may have a wide meaning, as referring 
both to a judgment which orders the defendant to perform the contract and to a judgment 
which allows the plaintiff to have the performance rendered by a third party (see 
BAUDOUIN, supra, footnote 1, p. 31, 222, 396, paras. 22, 355, 707) ; exécution en nature may 
also have a narrow meaning as referring only to an order addressed to the defendant to 
perform the contract (see TANCELIN, supra, footnote 1, p. 337, 365, paras. 634, 687). 
Thirdly, the expressions exécution par équivalence or exécution par équivalent may be used to 
refer to an award of damages, (exécution par équivalence pécuniaire) (see BAUDOUIN, supra, 
footnote 1, p. 222, 351, 400, paras. 355, 620, 713, and TANCELIN, supra, footnote 1, p. 337, 
para. 633) or to a judgment authorizing the plaintiff to have the performance rendered by a 
third party, (exécution en nature par équivalent) (see BAUDOUIN, supra, footnote 1, p. 396, 
para. 707). See generally, Dictionnaire de droit privé, supra, footnote 6, p. 88. 
9. In common law systems, if the defendant refuses to obey a decree of specific performance a 
court may enforce it by ordering a sheriff or an officer of the court to perform a simple act, 
such as delivering specific goods or signing a deed of transfer. (See infra, text accompanying 
footnotes 45 to 48). These are methods of enforcement of the judgment used in cases of 
disobedience by the defendants ; the judgment itself contemplates and assumes performance 
by the defendant itself. 
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negative contractual obligations i.e. obligations to do, to give, or not to do 
something l0, while the "specific performance" of the common law is a 
remedy used only to enforce positive contractual covenants ; the enforcement 
of negative contractual covenants is achieved in common law jurisdictions 
through the use of prohibitory injunctions. 
A third distinction between exécution en nature in Québec and specific 
performance of the Canadian common law provinces is that exécution en 
nature does not really fit the concept of a "remedy" in the sense given to that 
word in common law systems. When a Quebec court concludes that a 
plaintiff is entitled to exécution en nature it merely recognizes that he is 
entitled to performance in kind rather than to damages. The dispositive part 
of the judgment may adopt different forms of achieving such a result, as for 
example a mandatory injunction ordering the defendant to fulfill his 
contractual promise ". It is arguable that in such a case the remedy is the 
injunction and that the expression exécution en nature is used merely to 
10. The distinction between obligations to give, to do and not to do is essential to 
understanding the analysis by civil law authors of exécution en nature. The distinction was 
of minimal importance in Roman Law but in the middle ages it was resurrected and put to a 
different use by Bartolus : see infra, text accompanying footnotes 56 to 58. Article 1058 of 
the Québec Civil Code refers to the distinction when it states : "Every obligation must have 
for its object something which a party is obliged to give, or to do or not to do". F.H. Lawson 
uses the distinction in his discussion of remedies. He states : "Coercive remedies [which do 
not include declaratory judgments] may now be subdivided, first into positive and negative 
remedies. The former call for positive conduct on the part of the defendant, the latter for 
mere abstention from a particular course of conduct [...] By a further subdivision, positive 
remedies can be distinguished as orders to give, to do or to undo. The terms 'give' and 'do' 
need some explanation, for they are not used according to their ordinary popular meaning. 
They are in fact the most convenient translations of the Latin dare andfacere, of the French 
donner and faire. Donner is not confined to 'giving' but includes any transfer of ownership 
or possession by way of gift or sale or loan or for any other reason. Faire denotes any act 
other than transfer. Obvious examples are services of various kinds, by a servant to his 
master, by a carrier to a passenger. No doubt logically to 'undo' is a species of'doing' in 
this sense, but it is convenient to make of it a separate category." LAWSON, supra, footnote 1, 
p. 13. See also BAUDOUIN, supra, footnote 1, p. 30-31, paras. 20-22; PLANIOL & RIPERT, 
Treatise on the Civil Law, (Part 2), Louisiana, State Law Institute Translation, 1959, at 
p. 104. JACKSON, "Specific Performance of Contracts in Louisiana", (1950), 24 Tul. L. Rev. 
401, p. 412. 
11. See Québec Code of Civil Procedure, art. 751 which states in part as follows : "An injunction 
is an order of the Superior Court or of a judge thereof, enjoining a person, his officers, 
agents or employees [...] in cases which admit of it, to perform a particular act or 
operation." In Louisiana, specific performance may also be enforced by injunction, see La. 
C.C.P., art. 2504 and "Comment : Louisiana Law of Specific Performance : Code Provisions 
and Methods of Enforcement", (1966) 40 Tul. L. Rev. 340, p. 352. See also LITVINOFF, 
supra, footnote 1, p. 313, para. 168, n. 77. 
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indicate that the plaintiff is entitled to a specific rather than to a substitu-
tionary remedy 12. 
In spite of these differences between the specific performance of 
common law systems and exécution en nature, the civil codes of Québec l3 
and Louisiana14 use the expression "specific performance" to refer to 
12. For the distinction between specific and substitutionary remedies, see supra, footnote 7. It 
could not be seriously contended that when an injunction is used in Quebec or Louisiana to 
achieve the exécution en nature of a contract, such an injunction is only the method of 
enforcing the remedy of exécution en nature. Both common law and civil law systems 
contrast remedies on the one hand with substantive rights and methods of enforcement on the 
other. For example an award of damages is a remedy which can be awarded in both legal 
systems to a buyer because of the breach by the seller of the buyer's substantive right to 
receive goods of a certain quality. The method of enforcement of this judgment may be the 
attachment of a debt owed to the seller or the seizure of chattels owned by him. In both 
legal systems courts assume compliance with their judgment and the choice and pursuit of 
methods of enforcement are left to the discretion of the plaintiffs in those cases in which the 
defendants do not comply voluntarily with the judgments. Moreover, injunctions have their 
own method of enforcement, contempt proceedings, regulated in Quebec by article 761 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. For a criticism of the use of the injunction, a common law 
remedy, in a civil law jurisdiction, see MASSÉ, G., "L'exécution des obligations via 
l'astreinte française et l'injonction québécoise", (1984), 44 R. du B. 659. 
13. See articles 1065, 1610 and 1628. Article 1065 states : "Every obligation renders the debtor 
liable in damages in case of a breach of it on his part. The creditor may, in cases which admit 
of it. demand also a specific performance of the obligation, and that he be authorized to 
execute it at the debtor's expense, or that the contract from which the obligation arises be set 
aside; subject to the special provisions contained in this code, and without prejudice, in 
either case, to his claim for damages." (Emphasis added). The French version of article 1065 
states as follows: "Toute obligation rend le débiteur passible de dommages en cas de 
contravention de sa part ; dans les cas qui le permettent, le créancier peut aussi demander 
l'exécution de l'obligation même, et l'autorisation de la faire exécuter aux dépens du débiteur, 
ou la résolution du contrat d'où naît l'obligation; sauf les exceptions contenues dans ce 
Code et sans préjudice à son recours pour les dommages-intérêts dans tous les cas." (Italics 
added). It should be noted that while the French version of article 1065 uses the definite 
article when it refers to "/"execution de l'obligation même", the English version uses the 
indefinite article when it mentions "o specific performance of the obligation". The wording 
of the English version of article 1065 would appear to recognize the fact that there are 
different kinds of "specific performance" available under Quebec law i.e. specific perform-
ance of the contract by the defendant, by the sheriff, by a person other than the defendant 
at his expense, etc. 
14. Article 1926 of the Louisiana Civil Code states as follows: "On the breach of any obligation 
to do, or not to do, the obligee is entitled either to damages, or, in cases which permit it, to a 
specific performance of the contract, at his option, or he may require the dissolution of the 
contract [...]" (Emphasis added). Article 1927 of the Louisiana Civil Code states: "In 
ordinary cases, the breach of such a contract entitles the party aggrieved only to damages, 
but where this would be an inadequate compensation, and the party has the power of 
performing the contract, he may be constrained to a specific performance by means 
prescribed in the laws which regulate the practice of the courts." 
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exécution en nature. A great deal of confusion is generated when it is 
forgotten that when legal writers or the Québec and Louisiana codes use the 
English expression "specific performance" to refer to exécution en nature, 
they mean something very different from the specific performance of 
common law systems. It is probably to avoid this confusion that the English 
version of the proposed new Québec Civil Code uses the expression "execution 
in kind" when it refer to exécution en nature l5. 
A subsequent section will show that the fact that exécution en nature covers 
performance by persons other than the defendant is closely related to the 
perceived difficulties in the enforcement of obligations "to do" and to the 
history of the doctrinal controversies surrounding such enforcement. It will 
also show that the narrow meaning of the expression "specific performance" 
is closely related to the history of the courts of equity which enforced 
contracts by ordering defendants to perform them personally. 
Even if we conclude that any statements which purport to contrast the 
relative importance of specific performance in civil law and common law 
jurisdictions is inaccurate, we may still wonder whether it is still correct to 
say that exécution en nature is the primary remedy in civil law systems and 
damages in common law ones. The following sections will show that the 
expression "primary remedy" can be interpreted in a number of ways, and 
the expression "breach of contract" covers such a variety of fact situations 
that it is not possible to say that any legal system favours the award of a 
particular remedy in all types of breach. 
1.2. The meanings of the expression "primary remedy" 
The expression "primary remedy" in statements such as those quoted at 
the beginning of this article may be understood in at least three ways, i.e. it 
may be used in a doctrinal sense, as a "policy preference" or in a statistical 
sense. 
First, in a purely doctrinal sense, the expression "primary remedy" may 
be taken to mean that the initial rule in a particular legal system is for the 
general availability16, of a particular remedy; this remedy is taken to 
15. See the Draft Civil Code and Commentaries, Québec, Éditeur officiel du Québec, 1978, 
articles 267 to 287 of Book V. For a description and evaluation of the Quebec Draft Civil 
Code, see MACDONALD, R.A., "Comments", (1980) 58 Can. B. Rev. 185; see also 
HAANAPPEL, P.P.C., "Contract Law Reform in Quebec", (1982) 60 Can. B. Rev. 393. 
16. In common law systems the expression "as of right" has been applied to the remedy of 
damages to mean that a plaintiff is always entitled to it upon breach. Equitable remedies 
have traditionally been considered as discretionary even though they are always granted in 
certain fact situations in the absence of good reasons to the contrary. In Redland Bricks Ltd. 
L. J. ROMERO Specific performance 793 
represent the general rule, and the cases in which it is not granted are 
considered the exceptions. 
Even if it were true that civil law systems start with a prima facie rule 
entitling plaintiffs to exécution en nature and common law systems with one 
entitling them to damages this would not necessarily mean that each system 
favours the award of those remedies or that such remedies are the ones most 
often awarded by the courts. Both in common law and civil law systems 
changes often take place by virtue of an increase in the number of exceptions 
to a general rule, until the exceptions become more important than the initial 
rule. At this point the legal system favours the policy embodied in the 
exceptions rather than that embodied in the rule. Later the system may be 
simplified by reversing the rule and the exceptions : the previous exceptions 
become the rule and the old rule now becomes the new exception17. The 
scope of application of a prima facie substantive rule may be substantially 
reduced not only by the exceptions to it, but also by other rules within the 
legal system such as those dealing with procedure, remedies or enforcement 
of judgements. 
In a subsequent section it will be argued that, subject to some 
qualifications, it is in this doctrinal sense that it can be said that damages 
have historically been the primary remedy in common law systems and 
exécution en nature the primary remedy in civil law systems. 
The above discussion already touches upon the second meaning of 
"primary remedy" or "primary rule" i.e. "policy preference". A remedy may 
be the primary one in the doctrinal sense, because it is the one that the initial 
rule says is generally available, but it may not be the primary one in the 
policy preference sense, because it is undermined by its numerous exceptions 
and by the other rules in the system to such extent that it can no longer be 
said to be the one favoured by the rules of a legal system. For example, there 
are many judicial statements in Québec to the effect that exécution en nature 
is the primary remedy in Québec law, but for a long period of the history of 
v. Morris, [1970] A.C. 652, Lord Upjohn said at p. 664 : "[The plaintiff] may not be entitled 
as of right to such an injunction, for the granting of an injunction is in its nature a 
discretionary remedy, but he is entitled 'as of course' which comes to much the same thing." 
17. An typical example of a common law prima facie rule that has been almost abolished by its 
exceptions is the parol evidence rule. A well known English textbook on the law of contract 
discusses the parol evidence rule under two major headings, one that outlines the general 
rule and another one that deals with exceptions. While the statement of the rule takes only 
one paragraph, the discussion of thirteen exceptions to it take four pages. In a final heading 
entitled "Criticism" the author concludes : "In the present state of the law the 'exceptions' 
have become for practical purposes more important than the rule." See TREITEL, G.H., The 
Law of Contract, 6lh ed., London, Stevens, 1983, p. 151-158. 
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Québec law courts have been unable to enforce directely obligations to do and 
not to do. Only in 1922 was it settled that prohibitive injunctions could be used 
in Québec to enforce obligations not to do 18 while it was not until the Code of 
Civil Procedure introduced into Québec law mandatory injunctions in 1966 19 
that courts have been able to order defendants to perform their contractual 
obligations. The discussion in this article will show that although the laws of 
Québec and of the other Canadian provinces start with different prima facie 
rules as to preferable remedies, both systems qualify them to such an extent 
that it will be a judgment call to determine which remedy is favoured by each 
system. 
The participants in a legal system may recognize and articulate the shifts 
in policy preferences, or they may continue to assert the importance of the 
policies embodied in the old initial rule even when it is no longer the one 
favoured by the overall impact of all the rules in the system. 
The expression "primary remedy" may be taken in a third statistical 
sense to mean that, in cases of litigation for breach of contract, a certain 
remedy is the one most frequently requested by plaintiffs or awarded by the 
courts. Even if we conclude that all the substantive, remedial, procedural 
and enforcement rules of a legal system taken as a whole favour a certain 
result, it may be that such result is not the one most frequently achieved in 
practice, because of disincentives, costs, externalities or practical considera-
tions which lead the parties to a form of behaviour different from that 
favoured by the legal system20. 
The different meanings of the expression "primary remedy" may be a 
source of confusion when a writer uses it in one sense and a reader takes it in 
another. For example a writer may state that a remedy is the primary one, 
meaning that the prima facie rule is for its general availability, subject to 
exceptions, and a reader may think that he means that it is the one most 
often awarded in practice. 
18. See Canada Paper Co. v. Brown, (1921) 63 S.C.R. 243; see generally MASSÉ, supra, 
footnote 12. 
19. See supra, footnote 11. 
20. See generally, MACAULAY, S., "Noncontractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary 
Study", (1963) 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55; BEALE, H. and DUGDALE, T., "Contracts Between 
Businessmen ; Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies", (1975) 2 Brit. J. of Law and 
Soc. 45; MACNEIL, I., The New Social Contract, New Haven, Yale U.P., 1980. For the 
importance of empirical evidence of transaction costs in the study of the efficiency of legal 
rules see MACNEIL, I. R., "Efficient Breach of Contract : Circles in the Sky", (1982) 68 Virg. 
L. Rev. 9A1. 
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1.3. The meanings of the expression "breach of contract" 
A wide variety of fact situations are included under the expression 
"breach of contract" in common law systems. As Treitel has stated, 
A breach of contract is committed when a party without lawful excuse fails or 
refuses to perform, performs defectively or incapacitates himself from perform-
ing the contract.21 
In Québec law the closest equivalent to breach of contract is inexécution 
du contrat22. The word inexécution may be used in a narrow and in a wide 
sense. In its narrow sense it refers exclusively to cases of non performance, 
e.g. when a seller of land refuses to transfer it to the buyer, or when a 
landlord refuses to perform the repairs agreed to in the leases. In its wide 
sense inexécution covers both non performance and defective performance23. 
Inexécution has this wide meaning because all cases of defective performance 
may be characterized as cases of non performance ; for example, late delivery 
by a seller may be seen as non performance at the agreed time ; a sale of 
defective goods may be seen as non performance of the duty to deliver goods 
of the right quality24. 
The use of blanket expressions such as "breach of contract" or 
"inexécution du contrat" should not hide the fact that both cover a wide 
variety of situations in which innocent parties suffer very different types of 
loss25. For example, if a seller's breach is his failure to deliver the goods, the 
21. TREITEL, supra, footnote 17, p. 627. 
22. Sometimes lawyers and judges use the expression bris de contrat, but this is merely a 
translation of the common law expression and it is not used by Quebec authors or even 
defined in the Dictionnaire du droit privé, supra, footnote 6. 
23. The Dictionnaire du droit privé, supra, footnote 6, p. 107 defines inexécution as "Fait de mal 
exécuter ou de ne pas exécuter, totalement ou partiellement, une obligation." DAVID, R. 
states in Les contrats en droit anglais, 2e édition, par PUGSLEY, D., Paris, Librairie générale 
de droit, 1985, p. 407 : "Il y a inexécution lorsqu'une partie n'exécute pas, à la date prévue, 
les obligations qui lui incombent en vertu du contrat. Nous noterons seulement, à ce 
propos, la variété possible des types d'inexécution, de l'inexécution totale, qui est le cas le 
plus simple, mais non le plus fréquent, à la simple exécution défectueuse ou irrégulière: 
prestation non effectuée au jour dû, ou différant en quantité ou qualité de ce que prévoyait 
le contrat." 
24. "... une obligation mal exécutée est une obligation non exécutée": BAUDOUIN, supra, 
footnote 1, p. 405, para. 723. Common law judges used the same argument when they held 
that if the goods delivered did not conform in every respect with the description under 
which they were sold there was a total failure of the seller's obligation to deliver the 
described goods. See Bowes v. Shand, [1877] 2 A.C. 455 (H.L.); this approach has been 
disapproved in recent cases; see Ashington Piggeries Ltd. v. Christopher Hill, [1972] A.C. 
441 (H.L.) ; Reardon Smith Line v. Hansen-Tangen, [1976] 3 All E.R. 570. 
25. In their discussion of the options available to the innocent party in cases of inexécution, civil 
law authors draw a distinction between refus d'exécution, inexécution totale, inexécution 
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buyer suffers a total loss of his bargain, i.e. he loses the whole of his 
expectation interest26. However, if the seller's breach is making late delivery, 
or delivering goods with a minor defect, a buyer who does not reject the 
goods suffers only a partial loss of his expectation interest. If the seller's 
breach consist in delivering defective goods which cause personal injuries or 
damage to property, the buyer suffers consequential losses 21, which are often 
quite different in nature and size from his loss of bargain2 8 . It cannot be 
seriously contended that exécution en nature is the ideal or preferred remedy 
to compensate the plaintiffs in all of these cases because its indiscriminate 
award would be contrary to the basic principle of contract law that remedies 
are designed to compensate plaintiffs for their losses29. To award specific 
performance in cases of late delivery, or of a minor breach of the seller's 
obligations, after the contract has been performed, would overcompensate 
partielle, inexécution d'une obligation accessoire, exécution tardive, and exécution défectueuse : 
see BAUDOUIN, supra, footnote 1, p. 267, para. 459 and p. 403-405, paras. 715-723; 
TANCELIN, supra, footnote I, p. 128, para. 252. 
26. A description of the expectation interest is contained in section 347 of the Restatement of 
the Law — Contracts, 2d, American Law Institute, which states : "[...] the injured party has 
a right to damages based on his expectation interest as measured by [...] the loss in the value 
to him of the other party's performance caused by its failure or deficiency." See generally. 
FULLER and PERDUE, "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages", (1936) 46 YaleL. Rev. 
52 (Part 1) and 373 (Part 2). 
27. A description of consequential losses is contained in section 2-715 (2) of the Uniform 
Commercial Code which states : "Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach 
include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which 
the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be 
prevented by cover or otherwise; and (b) injury to person or property proximately 
resulting from any breach of warranty." 
28. This point can be illustrated by a consideration of the facts of a well known English case. In 
Godleyv. Perr\, [1960] 1 W.L.R. 9, a buyer lost an eye in an accident caused by a defective 
slingshot which broke when he was using it. He successfully sued the seller for breach of the 
implied condition of merchantable quality and recovered damages, calculated to compensate 
him for the loss of his eye, which were several thousand times the value of the slingshot. His 
loss of bargain was merely the difference between the value of a nondefective slingshot and 
a defective one ; such a loss in the value of the performance could be compensated, if it 
was otherwise possible, by an action for rescission of the contract sale to the slingshot 
(action redhibitoire), an action for the diminution of its price, or an action for specific 
performance of the contract to delivery of a nondefective slingshot. But neither of these 
remedies would compensate the plaintiff for the loss of his eye. 
29. "La responsabilité civile a pour but la réparation du dommage ou préjudice subi par la 
victime. Elle est compensatoire et non répressive. Elle joue uniquement à titre curatif." 
TANCELIN, supra, footnote 1, p. 204, para. 398 ; see also para. 748, p. 398. Article 1073 of the 
Québec Civil Code states: "The damages due to the creditor are in general the amount of 
the loss that he has sustained and of the profit of which he has been deprived [...]". 
Article 289 of the Project of the Civil Code states : "Les dommages-intérêts sont accordés 
en réparation du préjudice subi par le créancier." For a general discussion of the 
compensation principle in common law systems see TREWEL, supra, footnote 21, p. 701-705. 
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the plaintiffs. To award only specific performance in cases in which the 
plaintiffs have suffered consequential losses would undercompensate them30. 
Thus, general statements to the effect that specific performance is the 
primary remedy for breach of contract in civil law systems31, must be 
qualified further : such statements can only refer to a subcategory of cases of 
breach of contract, i.e. to cases of non performance, or of inexécution du 
contrat in its narrow sense, and they are not intended to apply to all cases of 
inexécution. 
Moreover, general statements to the effect that the preferred remedy for 
breach of contracts in common law systems is damages has to be qualified in 
at least two ways. First, when the breach of contract is the failure to convey 
an interest in land the preferred remedy is specific performance and not 
damages 32. Secondly, when there is a threatened breach of a promise not to 
do something, the preferred remedy is a prohibitory injunction33. 
2. Historical explanations of the different approaches 
The lack of equivalence between specific performance and exécution en 
nature outlined above does not merely represent a difference in terminology ; 
it reflects divergent approaches to the enforcement of contracts. To appreciate 
these differences, as well as the meaning of statements as to primary 
remedies, will require a brief historical survey. 
2.1. Specific performance 
Specific performance is a remedy created and developed in a pragmatic 
manner by the English Courts of Chancery. It shares some of the characteris-
tics of the law developed by those courts. 
30. Both in common law and civil law systems specific performance can be combined with an 
award of damages or compensation, but the point being made here is that in many cases of 
defective performance specific performance, by itself, is not the most adequate or preferable 
remedy. 
31. See supra, text accompanying footnotes 1 and 2. 
32. See infra, text accompanying footnote 40. 
33. In the last few decades common law courts have made prohibitory injunctions readily 
available for the enforcement of negative contractual covenants. F.H. Lawson states: 
"Although according to their equitable origin they are in principle discretionary, once the 
injurious character of the conduct complained of is established, injunctions are issued 'as of 
course', that is to say, a court will refuse to issue an injunction only in quite exceptional 
cases." He also gives the reasons for this development : "[A] negative judgment is easier to 
perform [than a positive one], [...] the performance of it is easier to supervise and enforce, 
and it gives the most complete and convenient result": LAWSON, supra, footnote 1, p. 179 
and 13. 
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One of the characteristics of specific performance is that it orders the 
defendant to do something, while exécution en nature encompasses a number 
of remedies aimed at giving the plaintiff performance in kind rather than a 
monetary award14. This characteristic of specific performance is closely 
related to a policy adopted by the Courts of Chancery from an early date 
which is embodied in the maxim "Equity acts in personam". 
The court of equity originated in the activity of the Lord Chancellors 
who were concerned with the enforcement of behaviour consistent with the 
dictates of conscience35, and who, as a consequence, were mainly preoccupied 
with motivating defendants to change their conduct. As Simpson states, 
[A]s a judge of conscience [... the Chancellor's] primary function and concern 
was not with the petitioner but with the respondent and of [sic] the good of his 
soul [...] a remedy is given to a petitioner not primarily to look after his 
interests, but rather to look after the losing party who has done wrong or 
proposes to do wrong. Indirectly, of course, this does look after the petitioner, 
for the avoidance of sin usually does benefit others, but this effect is incidental : 
hence arises the principle that equity acts in personam. This too is the 
explanation for the insistence upon specific performance, which compels the 
sinner to put matters right, which he must do if his soul is to be saved.36 
34. See supra, text accompanying footnote 6. The form of judgment available to the courts of 
Chancery before 1875 was "the defendant do pay", while judgments of the courts of 
common law used the form "the plaintiff äo recover". Both forms of judgments were made 
available to the Supreme Court in 1875: see Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., 
[1976] A.C. 443 (H.L.), p. 497, per Lord Cross of Chelsea. 
35. "If one had inquired of a late-fifteenth-century lawyer the appropriate title for a book on 
what went on before the court of Chancery, he would without doubt have said 'Conscience', 
not 'Equity'. Now it is at first sight a curious fact, which has frequently been noted, that 
references to any early connection between the Chancery and 'Equity' are extremely 
uncommon. It is also very significant." SIMPSON, A.W.B., A History of the Common Law of 
Contract, The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 398. 
36. Id., p. 398. MILSOM, S.F.C., states in Historical Foundations of the Common Law, 2nd ed., 
Toronto, Butterworths, 1981, p. 89-90 : "Discussion has normally turned upon the fact that 
most medieval chancellors were clerics, and that canonist ideas may for that chance reason 
have played a large part in early equity. But there is probably more to it than that. How 
could divine justive manifest itself? [...] [The Chancellor] had no special access either to 
absolute justice or to the minds of men; and he could not simply declare a result for 
himself. All he could do was to work upon the conscience of the party, where the rights of 
the matter were in some sense uniquely known. This necessity, rather than the coincidence 
of clerical chancellors, seems to explain procedural resemblances between chancery and 
courts Christian [...]. But most of all it seems to explain the nature of equitable decrees: 
results were not declared to be so ; instead parties were told to make them so. When a seller 
of land refuses to convey it, chancery did not declare that it belonged to the buyer 
notwithstanding this : it compelled the conveyance. Property in the land passed to the buyer 
because the seller after all conveyed it to him : the seller conveyed it because chancery told 
him to, and would punish disobedience. [...] Equity acts in personam because conscience 
does." See also KEETON, G.W. and SHERIDAN, L.A., Equity, 2niled., London, Pitman, 1969, 
p. 455 ; René DAVID, supra, footnote 3, p. 350, para. 300. 
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[A]ll early Chancery jurisdiction involved the coercion of the person who 
declined to act in accordance with good conscience, and the function of the 
subpoena in all instances was to compel conscientious behaviour, whatever 
that might involve, for the avoidance of sin [...]• Hence the specific performance 
of contracts was only an illustration of the general mode of proceeding adopted 
in all instances by the Chancellor, an aspect of the principle that equity acts in 
personam?1 
A second historical development which has influenced the remedy of specific 
performance was the adoption by the Chancellors of a policy embodied in 
the maxim "Equity follows the law". 
The Lord Chancellors did not develop a self-contained system of rules 
separate from or opposed to those of the common law, but merely a 
collection of disparate rules designed to supplement it in those areas in which 
it was defective. This point has been eloquently made by Maitland: 
Equity had come not to destroy the law, but to fulfill it. Every jot and every 
tittle of the law was to be obeyed, but when all this had been done something 
might yet be needful, something that equity would require. 
[...] 
[W]e ought to think of equity as supplementary law, a sort of appendix added 
on to our code, or as a sort of gloss written round our code, an appendix, a 
gloss, which used to be administered by courts specially designed for that 
purpose [...]. 
[...] I do not think that any one has expounded or ever will expound equity as a 
single, consistent system, an articulate body of law. It is a collection of 
appendixes between which there is no very close connexion.38 
In accordance with the above approach, when the common law courts 
developed a theory of contract and several forms of action for their 
enforcement, the Courts of Chancery refused to provide relief in all 
contractual disputes, limiting their intervention to cases in which they 
considered it necessary because of the serious imperfections of the common 
law 39. This is the origin of the prima facie rule that damages, the remedy 
awarded by common law courts, constituted the primary remedy for breach 
of contract. 
One of the most important cases of imperfection of the common law, 
which justified the intervention of the Courts of Chancery in contractual 
disputes, was the situation in which an award of damages would not fully 
37. SIMPSON, supra, footnote 35, p: 596. 
38. MAITLAND, supra, footnote 5, p. 17-19. See also DAVID, supra, footnote 3, p. 347 and 349, 
paras. 298, 299. 
39. See HOLDSWORTH, W., A History of English Law, London, Methuen, 1936, vol. I, p. 456, 
vol. IV, p. 322. 
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compensate the plaintiff for his loss40. This was considered to be the 
situation in cases of a seller's breach of contract to sell land or to transfer 
some interest in it. The reason why damages were thought to constitute an 
inadequate remedy in such cases has been explained as follows : 
There are many cases in which if a contract be broken no amount of damages 
that a jury will give will be a sufficient remedy to him who suffers by the 
breach. A man for example agrees to buy land, and he agrees perhaps to give 
for it more than any one else would have given. The seller refuses to perform 
his part of the agreement, it may be that no damages that could be given to the 
buyer would be a just compensation to him for his loss. What damages can you 
give? Even if land can be said to have a market value, still a man may well have 
consented to pay more than its market value and yet be very anxious that the 
agreement should be performed; to him the land has a fancy value.'" 
A third characteristic of the remedy of specific performance is related to 
the Chancellors' attitude towards coercion and imprisonment. At an early 
date unconscionable conduct of a defendant justified in the eyes of the 
Chancellors the use of coercion to induce him to change his behaviour under 
threat of imprisonment for contempt. Subsequent changes in public opinion 
in England, which led to the abolition of imprisonment for debt42, were 
contrary to the enforcement policies of the Courts of Chancery43. The rule 
which limited the availability of equitable remedies to those cases in which 
damages were an inadequate remedy was then seen as promoting the 
40. Id., vol. I, p. 457 ; see also BERRYMAN, J., "The Specific Performance Damages Continuum : 
An Historical Perspective", (1985) 17 Ottawa L. Rev. 295, p. 298-306. 
41. MAITLAND, supra, footnote 5, p. 301 ; see also BERRYMAN, supra, footnote 40, p. 306-311. It 
has been convincingly argued that the subjective interest of the buyer in each unique piece 
of land does not justify the award of specific performance to a purchaser who is merely 
speculating and has no particular interest in obtaining the parcel of land he agreed to buy. 
See SHARPE, R.J., Injunctions and Specific Performance, Toronto, Canada Law Book Inc., 
1983, p. 314-319, paras. 613-620. However common law courts continue to award 
automatically specific performance to enforce contracts for the sale of land irrespective of 
whether the buyer has a special interest in performance : see Bashir v. Koper, (1983) 40 O.R. 
(2d) 758 (C.A.). For the argument that sales of land were enforced through specific 
performance because of the social and political values associated in England with 
ownership of land see COHEN, D., "The Relationship of Contractual Remedies to Political 
and Social Status: A Preliminary Inquiry", (1982) 32 U. of Tor. L.J. 31. 
42. To a great extent imprisonment for debt had been used because of the imperfection of the 
laws relating to execution of money judgments, which did not permit the seizure of money, 
shares, bonds, or the attachment of debts. The importance of imprisonment for debt was 
considerably diminished when Acts passed in 1838 and 1840 allowed choses in action to be 
taken in execution and garnishee proceedings. Arrest on mesme process was abolished in 
1838 and on final process in 1869: see HOLDSWORTH, supra, footnote 39, vol. XI, p. 524, 
600, vol. XV, p. 144; see also ATIYAH, P.S., The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 190, 331, 677. 
43. See generally ATIYAH, supra, footnote 42, p. 292 s. 
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desirable result of reducing the use of coercion and contempt proceedings in 
civil matters44. In accordance with this new philosophy a number of XIXth 
century amendments to procedural statutes created various ways of enforcing 
decrees of specific performance other than through contempt proceedings. 
Such legislative amendments have allowed English and Canadian courts to 
enforce decrees of specific performance and mandatory injunctions by 
permitting the act required of the defendant to be performed by another 
person45, by appointing an officer to execute a deed or other instrument46, 
44. "[An explanation for the restricted availability of specific performance] may be found in 
the respect for individual freedom which has been such a striking feature of the 
development of English law. Even to the extent of declining to generalise remedies which 
compel the performance of the actual obligations assumed, courts of equity have normally 
restricted the remedy of specific performance to those contracts which involved the transfer 
of property, and have not so far extended it to contracts, such as contracts of service, which 
would have involved the application of measures of constraint, limiting personal freedom, 
for extended periods (e.g. a contract of apprenticeship as in De Francesco v. Barnum)" : 
KEETON, G.W. and SHERIDAN, L.A., Equity, 2nd ed., London, Professional Books, 1976, 
p. 360. As Karl Renner has convincingly argued, legal rules and institutions may remain 
relatively unchanged over the centuries and still vary the social and economic functions 
they perform. See RENNER, K., The Institution of Private Law and their Social Function, 
edited with an Introduction and Notes by Kahn-Freund, 0., London, Routledge & Kegan, 
1949 ; see generally, MACDONALD, R.A., "Social and Economic Control Through Law", 
(1977) 25 Chitty's L.J. 1. Writers belonging to the group loosely referred to as "law and 
economics" have justified on the basis of administrative and economic considerations many 
common law rules which were originally the result of historical chance: see generally, 
MACKAY, E., Economics of Information and Law, Boston, Kluwer, 1982, p. 35 s. 
45. See, for example, Rule 366 of the Queen's Bench Rules of Saskatchewan which states in part 
as follows : "Iff...] a mandatory order, injunction or judgment for the specific performance 
of any contract be not complied with, the court besides or instead of proceeding against the 
disobedient party for contempt, may direct that the act required to be done may be done so far 
as practicable by the party by whom the judgment or order has been obtained or some other 
person to be appointed by the court at the cost of the disobedient party, and upon the act 
being done the expenses incurred may be ascertained in such manner as the courts may 
direct and execution may issue for the amount so ascertained and costs." (Emphasis 
added). This rule is based on an English rule and it forms part of the Rules of Court of the 
other common law provinces, see Alberta, rule 354; British Columbia, rule 42(7), New 
Brunswick, rule 61.61; Nova Scotia, rule 52.03 ; Ontario, rule 60.11(9), (10) (old rule 579). 
46. See section 143 of the Ontario Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 223 as am., which states in 
part as follows : "( 1 ) Where a person has been directed by a judgment or order to execute a 
deed or other instrument, or make a surrender or transfer, and has refused or neglected to 
execute the deed or instrument, or make the surrender or transfer, and has been committed 
to prison under process for such contempt, or, being confined in prison for any other cause, 
has been charged with or detained under process for such contempt, and remains in prison, 
the court may grant a vesting order or may order or appoint an officer of the court to 
execute the deed or other instrument, or to make the surrender or transfer for and in the 
name of such person. (2) The execution of such deed or other instrument, or the surrender 
or transfer in his name made by such officer, has in all respects the same force and validity 
as if it has been executed or made by the person himself [...]". 
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or by issuing vesting orders transferring property from the defendant to the 
plaintiff47. This trend toward the enforcement of equitable remedies by 
indirect means, which do not require the forced cooperation of the defendant, 
has been reinforced by recent cases. These cases have held that such indirect 
methods of enforcement rather than contempt proceedings should be used in 
civil disputes whenever they can bring about the enforcement of the order. 
This new approach to the enforcement of equitable remedies has been 
described by an Ontario judge in the following terms : 
The entire tenor of our law is to make committal and attachment of the person 
a last resort for the enforcement of judgments. Committal or attachment 
should only be granted where reasonable attempts to obtain satisfaction by 
alternative methods have failed. 
[...] 
Sequestration, which affects the property but not the person of a defaulter, 
should therefore be attempted first [...]. If, by this mean, the judgment is not 
satisfied within a reasonable time [the plaintiff] may renew this motion and its 
request for attachment or committal48. 
This change in the attitude of common law judges toward the enforcement of 
equitable remedies has two important consequences for the purpose of 
47. See for example section 79 of the Ontario Judicature Act which states as follows : "Where 
the court has authority to direct the sale of any real or personal property or to order the 
execution of a deed, conveyance, transfer or assignment of any real or personal property, 
the court may by order vest the property in such person and in such manner and for such 
estates as would be done by any such deed, conveyance, assignment or transfer if executed ; 
and the order has the same effect as if the legal or other estate or interest in the property had 
been actually conveyed by the deed or otherwise, for the same estate or interest, to the 
person in whom the property is so ordered to be vested [...]". See also section 87 of the 
Saskatchewan Land Titles Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-5 which states in part as follows : "A judge 
of the Court of Queen's Bench may, upon such notice as he deems fit or, where in his 
opinion the circumstances warrant, without notice: (a) make a vesting order and may 
direct the registrar to cancel the certificate of title and duplicate thereof in the name of the 
person in whom by the order the lands are vested [...]". 
48. Leaseconcepl Ltd. v. French, (1977) 1 C.P.C. 161 (Ont. H.C.), p. 163, per Reid, J. In Miller v. 
Miller, (1977) 27 R.F.L. 139 (Ont. H.C.), Reid J. stated at p. 141 : "The law is equally clear 
that committal will not be ordered by this court except as a last resort. If a reasonable 
alternative exists it should be taken... In my opinion it does exist." See also Danchevskv v. 
Danehevsky, [1974] 3 All E.R. 934 in which Buckley L.J. stated at p. 938 : "[...] it is quite 
clear, I think [...] that the husband was in fact in contempt — and one might say in gross 
contempt — [...] But the fact remains that the objective could have been obtained by other 
relief which would not have involved committing the husband to prison for contempt of 
court [...] [Ijt was open to the wife to apply fora writ of possession and to execute the writ 
and thereby recover possession of the house from the husband, and to carry out that sale 
with the assistance, if necessary, of an order of the court directing some third party to 
execute the conveyance in the husband's place [...] [Tjhis is not an appropriate case for a 
committal order at all, the desired objective being capable of being achieved by means 
which would not have affected the freedom of the husband [...]". 
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comparative law. First the availability of indirect ways of enforcing specific 
performance without the defendant's cooperation brings the modern common 
law of specific performance closer to the civil law of exécution en nature. 
Secondly, through the use of these indirect methods, both legal systems 
implement the policy of protecting the plaintiffs interest in obtaining the 
performance in specie and, at the same time, the policy of avoiding putting 
unnecessary pressure on the defendant, or of avoiding proceedings which 
might lead to his imprisonment for failure to perform a contractual 
undertaking. 
2.2. Exécution en nature 
In contrast to specific performance, which was a remedy created and 
developed in a pragmatic manner by the English Courts of Chancery, 
exécution en nature was a legal concept developed in the middle ages by 
commentators of Roman law texts. Consequently the present day law on 
exécution en nature has been influenced by the history of the doctrinal 
controversies surrounding that concept as well as by the manner in which the 
XIXth century codes have regulated it. 
Roman law never developed any legal category equivalent to modern 
day exécution en nature. As did the common law, Roman law had several 
forms of judgment and methods of enforcement which changed over the 
centuries. At the time of the XII Tables, enforcement of judgments was 
against the person of the debtor, who could be reduced to slavery or killed by 
his creditors49. In the classical period of Roman law the only remedy 
available under pretorial procedure was money damages 50. Even though the 
Roman praetor would issue orders "to do" or "not to do", called "interdicts", 
49. For general discussions of remedies and methods of enforcement in Roman Law, see 
JOLOWICZ, U.V., Historical Introduction to Roman Law, Cambridge, University Press, 1954, 
p. 189-194, 223-226, 411, 463-464; DAWSON, J.P., "Specific Performance in France and 
Germany", (1959) 57 Mich. L. Rev. 495, p. 496-502 ; P.F. GIRARD, Manuel élémentaire du 
Droit romain, 8nd ed., (par M.F. SENN), Paris, Lib. Arthur Rousseau, 1929; GIFFARD, 
A.E.V., Précis de droit romain, Paris, Dalloz, 1938; GIFFARD, A.E.V., Cours de droit romain 
approfondi ; MEYNIAL, supra, footnote 7, p. 388-390. See BRISSAUD, J., Manuel d'histoire du 
droit privé, Paris, Fontemoing, 1908, who states: "Dans le très ancien droit, c'est la 
personne du débiteur, son corps, qui répond avant tout du paiement de sa dette [...] Par 
comparaison, la conduite de l'usurier du moyen âge, du personnage du Pecorone, dont 
Shakespeare a fait [...] Shyloc, dans son Marchand de Venise, est assez humaine; il se 
contente d'une livre de chair ou lieu de prendre le corps tout entier du débiteur [...] 
L'histoire de l'exécution forcée se résume dans le renversement de ces idées. Le créancier ne 
s'attaque plus à la personne du débiteur, mais à ses biens; en effet, celui-ci n'est plus 
considéré comme un coupable dont on cherche à se venger ; on lui réclame une valeur et son 
patrimoine doit la fournir." (p. 515, 516, 522-523). 
50. See BUCKLAND, W.W. and MCNAIR, A.H., Roman Law and Common Law —A Comparison 
in Outline, 2nd ed. revised by F.H. LAWSON, Cambridge, University Press, 1965, p. 412, 
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the method of enforcing these orders was only a monetary award to be 
executed against the property of the recalcitrant defendant51. Only at a late 
stage of Roman law, under Justinian's Corpus Iuris, could a judgment for 
the delivery of a specific chattel be enforced manu militari, by authorizing a 
court official to seize it5la. However Roman law did not develop methods of 
coercing defendants to fulfill their contractual obligations by threats of 
physical violence or imprisonment52. 
In the middle ages a number of commentators, relying on Roman texts, 
developed what is now called the law of obligations, which encompasses 
duties arising from contract, tort, restitution, statute and unjust enrichment53. 
One of the general concepts developed by these commentators was exécution 
en nature, which covered a number of ways in which, plaintiffs were entitled 
to claim actual performance rather than money. 
where the authors state: "The classical law, like our common law, aimed, not at making a 
party carry out his contract, but at making him pay for not doing so."; see BUCKLAND, 
W.W., Equity in Roman Law, London, University of London Press, p. 40 s. ; Fry E. stated : 
"It is certain that the Roman Law gave a title to damages as the sole right resulting from 
default in performance, and did not enforce specific performance directly or in any other 
manner than by giving such right to damages." See FRY, E., A Treatise on the Specific 
Performance of Contracts, 6lh ed. by NORTHCOTE, G.R., London, Stevens and Sons, 1921, 
p. 4; see also DAWSON, supra, footnote 49, p. 496. 
51. BUCKLAND states: "Nothing is more remarkable than the contrast between the strenuous 
language of the interdict and the comparatively feeble way in which it was enforced. The 
words of the interdict are imperative and uncompromising [...] The proceedings under it 
resolved themselves into the trial of an ordinary formulary action, and under that system 
the condemnation was always for a sum of money." : BUCKLAND, supra, footnote 50, p. 28. 
See also BUCKLAND and MCNAIR, supra, footnote 50, p. 4-5, 420-423; see also DAWSON, 
supra, footnote 49, p. 501. 
52. See BUCKLAND, .supra, footnote 50, p. 28-30; DAWSON, supra, footnote 49, p. 501. A direct 
manner of enforcing judgments to deliver specific chattels seems to have been to order the 
delivery of the chattel, or, in the alternative, payment of its value and to permit the plaintiff 
to swear to an inflated value of the chattel without fear of perjury. This is a historical 
precedent of the French astreinte and of the use of fines to enforce injunctions in Quebec 
and the Canadian common law provinces. See Bucki AND and MCNAIR, supra, footnote 50; 
DAWSON, supra, footnote 49, p. 498. BUCKLAND, W.W., supra, footnote 50, p. 29. 
53. See BUCKLAND and MCNAIR, supra, footnote 50, p. 192 where the authors states: "[...] the 
Roman obligationcs arc far from covering the whole field of what in modern theory are 
called 'iura in personam". It was not in accordance with the casuistic methods of the Roman 
lawyers, any more than it would be with us (we can hardly have said to have adopted the 
word), to seek for an exact definition of the abstract notion of obligatio. The word itself 
does not seem to be used as a legal term till the empire." See also AMOS and WALTON'S, 
Introduction to French Law, 2nd ed. by LAWSON, F.H., ANTON, A.E. and BROWN, L.N., 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 137 ; DAVID, supra, footnote 3, states at p. 85, para. 64 : 
"La doctrine, partant des données du droit romain, a dans les droits de la famille romano-
germanique construit un droit des obligations qui peut être regardé comme la partie 
centrale du droit civil, lui-même objet principal de la science juridique." 
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The medieval writers who developed the law of obligations saw 
exécution en nature both as the logical consequence of the binding nature of 
contracts, and as a way of promoting respect for promises54. They were 
influenced by ideas derived from canon law and natural law55. 
However, in spite of this initial preference for exécution en nature in 
cases of non performance of contracts, the commentators were faced with 
the problem of its enforceability. One of the medieval commentators of 
Roman texts, Bartolus, (1313-1357), mentioned the fact that in Roman law 
the only available remedy was damages except in the cases of seizure of 
specific chattels by a court official. In order to explain this approach he 
utilised the distinction, made in other areas of Roman law, between 
obligations "to give", "to do" and "not to do" 56. Thus he concluded that 
only obligations "to give" were subject fo exécution en nature while 
obligations "to do" and "not to do" were not57. He suggested that the 
reason for such a difference was that "to award the exécution en nature of 
obligations other than those to give would constitute a kind of servitude"58. 
54. Such policy has been expressed by a present day writer in the following terms: "Sous 
réserve de la force majeure, le créancier n'est-il pas alors fondé à exiger l'exécution en 
nature? Son cocontractant s'est en effet lié, et le condamner à verser des dommages-intérêts 
enlèverait tout son sens au respect de la parole donnée.": JEANDIDIER, W., "L'exécution 
forcée des obligations contractuelles de faire", (1976) 75 R.T.D.C. 700, p. 701-702. Last 
century common law judges emphasized the importance of upholding and enforcing 
promises; a typical statement is the following: "[I]f there is one thing which more than 
another public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall 
have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into freely and 
voluntarily should be held sacred.": Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 
(1875) L.R. 19 Eq. 462, p. 465, per Jessel, M.R. Statements about the importance of 
promoting respect of promises and of certainty and predicability in legal transactions (la 
sécurité juridique) are frequently made by present day civilians. This type of statement has 
become more rare in common law jurisdiction in recent years. An interesting account of 
possible reasons for this shift in emphasis is contained in ATIYAH, P.S., "From Principle to 
Pragmatism : Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law", [1980] IowaL. 
Rev. 1249 and ATIYAH, supra, footnote 42, p. 649-659, 671-680; see also PARRY, D.H., The 
Sanctity of Contract in English Law, London, Stevens, 1959. 
55. See generally, ATIYAH, VS., Promises, Morals, and Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, 
p. 9-28; FRIED, Ch., Contract as Promise, Cambridge, Harvard U.P., 1981. 
56. See supra, footnote 11. 
57. See generally MEYNIAL, supra, footnote 6, p. 392 ; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE and BARDE, 
Traité théorique et pratique de droit civil, 3e éd., Paris, Sirey, 1906, vol. 11, p. 470, para. 432. 
JACKSON, T.H., "Specific Performance in Louisiana, Past and Future", in DAINOW, J. (ed.), 
Essays on the Civil Law of Obligations, Bâton Rouge, Louisiana State Univ. P., 1968, 195, 
p. 196-200. 
58. "Quondam speciem servitutis", MEYNIAL, supra, footnote 7, p. 393 ; CARBONNIER, J., Droit 
civil, Paris, Thémis, 1967, vol. 4, p. 528. See generally, RATTIGAN, Bartolus, in Great 
Jurists of the World, MacDonnel and Manson ed., 1914. 
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Two centuries later, Antoine Fabre, (1557-1624) a president of the 
Senate of Savoy, embodied the same policy in the Latin maxim "Nemo 
praecise potest cogi ad factum" ("No one can be specifically compelled to 
act"), and he gave a justification for it : "because it cannot be done without 
violence or pressure" 59. 
Both Bartolus' distinction between different types of obligations and the 
"nemo praecise" maxim were used by several medieval scholars. They were 
adopted by Pothier, who stated that the direct enforcement of a debtor's 
obligations to do or not to do would constitute "an attack against his person 
and liberty"60. 
The commissioners responsible for the French Civil Code followed 
Pothier closely when they drafted the portions of the Code dealing with 
obligation. They embodied both Bartolus' distinction and the "nemo 
praecise" maxim in article 1142: 
Toute obligation de faire ou de ne pas faire se résout en dommages et intérêts 
en cas d'inexécution de la part du débiteur. 
Article 1142 was justified by one of the French codifiers in a report 
addressed to the French legislature in the following terms : 
le motif (de l'article 1142) est que nul ne peut être contraint dans sa personne à 
faire, ou à ne pas faire une chose, et que si cela était possible, ce serait une 
violence qui ne peut pas être un mode d'exécution des contrats.6 ' 
From an early date, French authors have interpreted article 1142 restrictively. 
They have argued that, even after adoption of the article, exécution en nature 
was not only possible but the preferred method of enforcing contractual 
obligations, because it was the logical consequence of the binding force of 
contract {la force obligationnelle du contrat) and the most adequate remedy 
to encourage respect for promises {le respect de la parole donnée). These 
authors generally agreed that the article excluded direct methods of enfor-
cement of contracts which would use force in order to coerce debtors to 
perform their obligations. They argued, further, that the article was never 
intended to exclude other indirect ways of giving plaintiffs contractual 
59. See CARBONNII R, supra, footnote 58, p. 528, n° 145; MEYNIAL, supra, footnote 7, p. 393; 
JEANDIDIER, supra, footnote 54, p. 702. 
60. POTHIER, Traité du contrai de louage, para. 66. "The chief feature of Pothier's discussion 
was its total lack of originality. He was in general a man of quite inferior talent, with a gift 
for simplification." : LAWSON, F.H., The Roman Law Reader, Oceana Publ. Dobby Ferry, 
1969, p. 187. 
61. Exposé de motifs by BIGOI-PREAMENEU, P. LOCRE, La législation civile, commerciale et 
criminelle de la France, 1828, vol. 12, p. 329, n°38. See also BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, jupra, 
footnote 57, p. 472, n° 432; LITVINOFF, supra, footnote I, p. 300. 
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performance rather than damages, such as seizure of the goods by a sheriff, 
performance by a third party or by the plaintiff at the defendant's expense. 
Such possibilities were contemplated by other articles of the Code62. It is 
these doctrinal controversies about the availability of direct or indirect ways 
of achieving the specific enforcement of contracts which has led to the wide 
scope of the concept of exécution en nature. 
The reasons advanced for the non availability of direct specific enfor-
cement by civil law authors and the adoption of article 1142 of the French 
Civil Code should not lead the reader to conclude that all civil law systems or 
even the French Civil Code itself have adopted a consistent policy against all 
remedies aimed at coercing the defendant to perform his obligations. First, 
other civil law systems did not follow the precedent established by article 
1142 of the French Civil Code. For example article 888 of the German 
Code of Civil Procedure states that when performance can be rendered only 
by the defendant himself he may be threatened with imprisonment for up to 
six month and fines of unlimited amount63. Secondly, articles 2059 to 2070 
of the French Civil Code regulated imprisonment for debts (contrainte par 
corps) in civil matters, while another French statute63a allowed imprisonment 
for debts of over 200 francs in commercial matters. These provisions were in 
force for over sixty years until imprisonment for debt in non-penal matters 
was abolished by a law passed in 1867 M. It seems reasonably clear that 
imprisonment for debt was used in France to coerce debtors to pay and not 
merely to punish them for their failure to do so. A French textbook states 
that imprisonment for debt was an efficacious method of forcing recalcitrant 
debtors to perform, of forcing hidden assets to appear, or of encouraging the 
62. Articles 1143 and 1144 of the French Civil Code clearly dealt with methods of achieving the 
indirect enforcement of contracts ; they state as follows: 
1143. Néanmoins le créancier a le droit de demander que ce qui aurait été fait par 
contravention à l'engagement, soit détruit ; et il peut se faire autoriser à le détruire aux 
dépens du débiteur, sans préjudice des dommages et intérêts, s'il y a lieu. 
1144. Le créancier peut aussi, en cas d'inexécution, être autorisé à faire exécuter lui-même 
l'obligation aux dépens du débiteur. 
See especially BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, supra, footnote 57, p. 468-479, no s 429 to 444, and 
authors cited therein. After an exhaustive analysis of article 1142 Baudry-Lacantinerie 
reaches the following conclusion : " O n voit qu'en définitive le législateur eut mieux fait de 
ne pas écrire la disposition de l'article 1142." Ibid., p. 473, para. 433. The Québec Civil Code 
did not adopt article 1142 but it simply stated in article 1065: " T h e creditor may in cases 
which admit of it, demand also a specific performance of the obligation [...]" (italics added). 
See supra, footnote 13. 
63. See Z W E I G E R T , K. and K O T Z , H. , An Introduction to Comparative Law, Nor th Holland, 
1977, vol. I, p. 144. 
64. For a discussion of imprisonment for debts in France before and after the adoption of the 
Napoleonic Code, see BRISSAUD, supra, footnote 49, p. 523-525. 
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family of the debtor perform his obligation65. Thirdly, French courts have 
developed a remedy called astreinte which puts financial pressure on 
defendants to perform their obligation by the imposition of punitive 
damages which will continue to accumulate for as long as the defendant 
refuses to obey the court's order66. Finally Quebec and Louisiana have 
adopted prohibitory and mandatory injunctions, two remedies developed by 
common law systems, and use them to enforce contractual obligations67. 
Conclusion 
The preceding analysis allows us to contrast the approaches of the 
common law and civil law to the enforcement of contractual obligations. 
First, in common law systems damages were historically treated as the prima 
facie remedy for breach of contract unless a case fell into one of the 
recognized exceptions. Only when the plaintiff could not be fully compensated 
for his loss did the courts of equity order the defendant to perform 
contractual obligations under threat of contempt proceedings and imprison-
ment. By way of contrast, civil law's historical preference for exécution en 
nature over damages emphasized the importance of respect for promises. 
However, this initial preference was modified by the absence in Roman and 
ancient law of remedies and methods of enforcement which coerced debtors 
to perform obligations to do or not to do. Even though each system starts 
from a different premise, the combined effect of initial rules and exceptions 
thereto may have brought the two into close alignment. 
Secondly, both systems show a tendency to greater availability of 
exécution en nature and specific performance. In Quebec law this trend is 
manifested by the availability of prohibitory injunctions68 and of mandatory 
injunctions69 for the enforcement of contractual obligations. It is also shown 
65. COLIN, A. et CAPITANT, H., Traité de droit civil, Paris, Dalloz, 1959, tome II, p. 758, 
para. 758 ; BRISSAUD, supra, footnote 49, states at p. 523 : "l'emprisonnement pour dette fut 
envisagé surtout comme un moyen d'amener le débiteur à payer son créancier à l'aide de 
ressources qu'on supposait cachées [...] Il servit aussi à obliger le débiteur à aliéner ses 
immeubles, tant que l'exécution forcée ne put pas porter sur cette catégorie des biens [...]" 
But see LITVINOFF, supra, footnote 1, p. 313 who states that imprisonment for debts "is a 
sanction for nonperforming instead of an actual forcing to perform which is the true 
substance of nemo praecise [...]" It is interesting to note that in England imprisonment for 
debt was used because of the impossibility of seizing in execution choses in action belonging 
to the judgment debtors, while in France it was used because of difficulties encountered in 
execution against land: see supra, footnote 42. 
66. See MASSÉ, supra, footnote 12 and bibliography cited therein. 
67. Ibid. See also PRUJINER, A., "Origines historiques de l'injonction en droit québécois", 
(1974)20 C. de D. 249. 
68. See supra, text accompanying footnote 18. 
69. See supra, text accompanying footnote 19. 
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by the recent willingness of Quebec courts to use mandatory injunctions to 
enforce contractual obligations "to do" 70. In the Canadian common law 
provinces and other common law jurisdictions the trend towards greater 
availability of specific performance has been associated with an increased 
realisation by courts and legal scholars of the failure of damages awards to 
fully compensate plaintiffs for their losses71. 
Thirdly, the greater availability of specific performance in common law 
jurisdictions has led a number of authors to wonder whether it is still true to 
say that common law systems show a policy preference for damages over 
specific performance. Lawson F.H. states: 
English law not only approaches in practice the civilian position, in which a 
general availability of specific performance is subject to exceptions admitted on 
practical grounds, but is substantially identical in principle also. It is indeed 
doubtful whether one ought not to regard the cases where damages are an 
adequate remedy as exceptions to a general availability of specific performance 
and as exceptions justifiable, though not originally introduced, on practical 
grounds.72 
René David has also stated : 
As a matter of fact the difference between the two systems, English and French, 
is much less in practice than one might be led to think. It may have been quite 
great in earlier times, but nowadays it may be doubted whether it has not been 
reduced to a matter of pure theory [...] It may well be doubted that English law 
in its present state is less liberal than French law concerning this matter of 
specific performance." 
As a reaction to this development, a number of common law authors have 
advocated the adoption of a "non-hierarchical" approach to the availability 
of remedies, depending on their relative advantages and disadvantages in 
each particular case, rather than changing the old rule to say that specific 
performance is the primary remedy except when it is inappropriate to grant 
it74. 
Fourthly, recent amendments to procedural legislation in common law 
jurisdictions which allow the enforcement of equitable remedies by a person 
70. Quebec courts have in recent years issued interlocutory mandatory injunctions ordering the 
Royal Bank to continue providing banking services at a certain location, and ordering 
Chrysler to continue a franchise agreement. See Les Propriétés Cité Concordia Ltd. c. La 
Banque Royale du Canada, [1983] R.D.J. 524 ; Chrysler Canada Ltée c. LaSalle Automobile 
Inc., C.A.M., n° 09-000336-72, conf. [1974] CS. 642. 
71. See especially, KRONMAN, A.T., "Specific Performance", (1978)45 Univ. Chic. L. Rev. 352; 
SCHWARTZ, A., "The Case for Specific Performance", (1979) 89 Yale L.J. 271. 
72. LAWSON, supra, footnote 1, p. 213. 
73. DAVID, R., English Law and French Law, London, Stevens & Sons, 1980, p. 126-127. 
74. See SHARPE, supra, footnote 41, p. 6, para. 8. 
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other than the defendants75 bring specific performance closer to exécution en 
nature. It is true that, technically speaking, those legislative changes do not 
expand the scope of the remedy but only the methods available for its 
enforcement; however their practical effect is the same as the performance 
by a third party at the defendant's expense referred to in article 1065 of the 
Québec Civil Code76. 
Fifthly, because of the wide scope of exécution en nature, civil law 
writers discuss together all the different modes of giving the plaintiff the 
contractual performance in specie rather than damages. By contrast, common 
law books and articles on specific performance deal almost exclusively with 
the equitable remedy, ignoring other means of giving the plaintiffs perform-
ance in kind which are available in common law systems, such as vesting 
orders77, actions for the price78, actions in replevin79, etc. I would suggest 
that the civil law approach is preferable because those other ways of giving 
plaintiffs specific relief80 perform the same economic function as specific 
performance81 and they may still be available to plaintiffs when specific 
performance is not82. 
75. See supra, text accompanying footnotes 45 to 48. 
76. See supra, footnote 13. 
77. See supra, footnote 47. 
78. In an action for the price or for an agreed sum a plaintiff seeks specific relief and these types 
of actions are considered to be forms of exécution en nature in civil law: see TANCELIN, 
supra, footnote 1, p. 365, para. 687 ; see also ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, Report on 
Sale of Goods, Toronto, Department of Justice, 1979, p. 415. 
79. In an action in replevin at common law, a plaintiff may recover possession of goods 
wrongfully taken from him. Under special legislation in British Columbia, Manitoba and 
Ontario a plaintiff may obtain possession of chattels when they have been wrongfully 
"detained" i.e. when he has been deprived of their possession, even if he has never been in 
actual possession of them. See Recovery of Goods Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 357 ; The Replevin 
Act, C.C.S.M., c. R. 100 ; The Replevin Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 449 ; see generally. LAW REFORM 
COMMISSION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, Report on the Replevin Act, Report n° 38, May 1978; 
BRAID and BALKARAN, "The Special Nature of the Common Law Action of Replevin in 
Manitoba", (1961) 33 Wo«. Bar News, 125. 
80. See supra, footnote 7. 
81. Most of the advantages and disadvantages of specific performance contained in recent 
articles apply to all forms of specific relief. See supra, articles cited in footnote 71. See also 
MURIS, "The Cost of Freely Granting Specific Performance", [1982] Duke L.J. 1053; 
YORIO, "In Defence of Money Damages for Breach of Contract", (1982) 82 Col. L. Rev. 
1365. 
82. For example in common law systems buyers of ordinary goods available in a market are not 
entitled to specific performance ordering sellers to deliver them, as in such cases an award 
of damages is considered to constitute an adequate remedy: see supra, text accompanying 
footnotes 40 and 41. However buyers in British Columbia, Manitoba and Ontario may be 
able to obtain possession of those same goods in an action in repleving under special 
legislation which expands the scope of the common law action : see supra, footnote 79. It is 
L. J. ROMERO Specific performance 811 
Finally, an analysis of the historical evolution of the approaches of civil 
law and common law systems to the enforcement of contracts show that 
both systems share the same policy concerns, namely, protection of the 
plaintiffs interest in receiving actual performance of the contractual pro-
mise83 and the unwillingness to use imprisonment or other methods of 
coercion to force the defendant to perform personally his contractual 
promise84. At the same time the point of balance between those two 
conflicting policies has changed over the history of both systems. As a civil 
law author has stated : 
[L]es idées reçues aujourd'hui sont l'aboutissement du conflit des doctrines sur 
le concept, le fondement et les buts du droit, de l'évolution des idées dans le 
passé et des tendances actuelles. L'étude du droit ne peut en aucune façon 
consister à n'apprendre que les règles de technique juridiques en vigueur. Cela 
est particulièrement vrai en matière de droit des obligations, qui est intimement 
lié aux conceptions philosophiques et politiques de la société.85 
not enough to state merely that specific performance is not available to buyers who desire 
to obtain possession of ordinary goods when they can do so in a repleving action. See 
ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra, footnote 78, p. 440. 
83. See supra, footnote 54. 
84. Many authors and judges have stated this policy as a concern with the defendant's liberty 
rather than with the use of certain means of coercion, such as imprisonment, for the 
enforcement of civil obligations. However, as a Quebec judge has stated, "the [injunction] 
order does not seek to restrain or interfere with the personal liberty of the respondent. He is 
merely told he must respect his contract, and if he respects his contract, no harm comes to 
him. If he does not, he acts at his peril; he violates his contract, disobeys the order of the 
court and he takes the consequences. Lombard v. Varennes el Théâtre National, (1922) 32 
B.R. 164, p. 170, per Martin J. (dissenting); a compromise between the policy of giving 
the plaintiff what he was promised and the policy of avoiding imprisonment in civil 
matters is achieved in French law by the astreinte which puts financial pressure on 
the defendant to perform his contractual obligation : see supra, text accompanying footnote 
66. The use of financial pressure to motivate defendants to perform their contractual 
obligations is available to the courts of Quebec and the Canadian common law provinces. 
Under section 761 of the Québec Code of Civil Procedure a court may impose consecutive 
fines of up to $50,000 until the defendant obeys the injunction. In common law jurisdictions 
courts have the power to fine those who disobey injunctions or orders of specific 
performance: see generally, SPRY, I.CF., The Principles of Equitable Remedies, 3rd ed., 
London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1984, p. 355 s. 
85. TANCELIN, supra, footnote 1, p. 4, para. 7. 
